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THE LIMITS OF THE
ARTISTIC IMAGINATION,
AND THE SECULAR INTELLECTUAL
Edward W. Said
Poetry is one of the things we do to our
ignorance; criticism makes us conscious of
what we have done, and sometimes makes us
conscious of what can be done next, or done
again.
R. P. Blackmur1

I. Literary Worlds
In her fine new book, Writing and Being, Nadine Gordimer
argues that the modern writer uses fiction to enact life, to
explore worlds that are concealed in the turmoil of everyday
reality, to investigate politics that are otherwise forbidden or
ignored. For her, writers like Naguib Mahfouz, Chinua Achebe,
and Amos Oz are witnesses to a struggle for truth and freedom,
their writings testimonial to a quest, she says, “in the alternative
world by alternative writers.” What they look for is “the Home
that is truth, undefined by walls, by borders, by regimes.”2
Although we might want to dispute the choice of writers — is
Amos Oz, or even Mahfouz, as much an “alternative” writer as
she claims? — and might also want to question whether what
appears like an antinationalist argument in their work is not in
fact a deeper form of nationalism, it would be hard to disagree
with Gordimer’s suggestion that imaginative writers really do
reach out beyond the confines of their time and place to a more
spacious region not hemmed in by conventional loyalties, traditions, and regimes. Even if they do not actually provide readers
with a map of that utopian space, there is the process of striving
itself, which is embodied in their fiction or poetry or drama,
whose salutary effect is both liberating and exploratory.
3
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I don’t mean to be critical of Gordimer’s thesis when I say that
it is a profoundly romantic one, echoing a large number of declarations and avowals across the ages, East, West, North, and
South, in which the poet is described as a vatic figure, proclaiming unseen or unheard truths, defying mundane authority as
well as priestly power, venturing where angels have feared to
tread. Here is Mary Shelley writing in 1821:
It is impossible to read the compositions of the most celebrated
writers of the day without being startled with the electric life
which burns within their words. They measure the circumference
and sound the depths of human nature with a comprehensive
and all-penetrating spirit, and they are perhaps the most seriously astonished at its manifestations; for it is less their spirit
than the spirit of the age. Poets are the hierophants of an unapprehended inspiration; the mirrors of the gigantic shadow which
futurity casts upon the present; the words which express what
they understand not; the trumpets which sing to battle, and feel
not what they inspire; the influence which is moved not, but
moves. Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world.3

Obviously there are differences between this impassioned,
visionary statement of the poets’ capacities and Gordimer’s
much more sober and analytic view of the literary artist. She
justly believes that the writer is in fact deeply implicated in his
or her society and cannot remain the unmoved mover. But both
Gordimer and Shelley ascribe to the artistic imagination a
greater capacity for seeing and understanding than is given to
the ordinary citizen, and both also propose that we listen to the
poet or novelist as someone who has moved beyond the boundaries of quotidian interests.
Even Joyce’s Stephen Dedalus, who bristles with refusals and
rejections, is not so far from Gordimer. One hundred years after
Shelley, Joyce has Dedalus say,
I will tell you what I will do and what I will not do. I will not
serve that in which I no longer believe, whether it calls itself my
home, my fatherland, or my church; and I will try to express
myself in some mode of life or art as freely as I can and as wholly
as I can, using for my defence the only arms I allow myself to use
—silence, exile, cunning.4

4
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This is a relatively circumscribed declaration of principles; it
neither takes on the whole world’s problems nor attempts to
legislate for all mankind. But it gives privilege and even sanctity
to the artist while also locating in the artist’s vocation both freedom and power of extraordinary expression. Joyce will later
mock Stephen for his prissiness and, more essentially, for his
inability to produce much in the way of writing. But there has
remained in later readers (like Gordimer) something of Joyce’s
admiration for the artistic imagination, at least in its rejectionist,
intransigent mode.
What has changed since Shelley and Joyce spoke mainly
about the European artist is the emergence for the first time of
an international literary marketplace in which — again for the
first time—a highly selective group of authors from Latin America, the Indian Subcontinent, the Far East, parts of Africa, Australia, and the Caribbean are translated, published, and
circulated on a mass scale out of great commercial centers like
London, Paris, and New York. This is one of the main features of
the postcolonial world, this massive absorption of formerly foreign, exotic, and, in some respects, unhoused writers into an
enormous circulation system dominated by gigantic publishing
houses and conglomerates, media empires, and consumer tastes
that can hardly be said to provide authors with a neutral, or at
least open, reception. True, there has appeared an important
Anglophone and Francophone literature written by individuals
neither French nor English, expressing ideas, devising forms,
inventing worlds that are extraordinarily original, but these
have become part of the global system whose core is in the
North, so to speak; whatever may have begun as a local invention — García Márquez’s Macondo, Rushdie’s Bombay, or even
Mahfouz’s Cairo5 — has been transformed into something cosmopolitan and international, in both the good and bad senses of
those words.
I do not think, therefore, it is an exaggeration to speak of the
globalization of literature. Of course, Colombians and Mexicans
are García Márquez’s first readers, and, of course, in one sense
he is still a vital local presence in Latin America, read on mountain buses by ordinary people in Peru, for example, but the
power of his presence is an international one consolidated by
the Nobel Prize and backed by corporations like Random
5

04/18/96 3:53 PM

1880sai2.qxd

Macalester International

Vol. 3

House, institutions that are not bound by national barriers. This
is true of a relatively small number of writers — Milan Kundera,
Salman Rushdie, Kazuo Ishiguro, Michael Ondaantje, Seamus
Heaney, Ben Jelloun, Vikram Seth, Derek Walcott, and Wole
Soyinka, among several others — all of whom have become staples of any international reading list of crucial contemporary
artistic sensibilities. I intend no disparagement at all of these
quite first-rate artists, most of whom I respect and care for very
deeply. But what I am trying to point to is a dialectic other than
the one indicated by Gordimer (who is certainly a major figure
on the international artistic landscape), one in which writer and
international market interact to produce recognizable, admired,
much-circulated figures who belong, so to speak, to world literature. We still know very little about what effect this interaction
has on the writer as he or she writes, but it is arguably true that
knowing that one’s audience is no longer only someone in
Bogotá or Rabat inflects even sentences, and certainly structures,
in an unmistakable way. As a great supporter of Salman
Rushdie’s gifts and accomplishments, I think it is still possible to
say that had he not had a London or New York audience in
mind when he wrote The Satanic Verses6 and had he had only a
community of Indian Muslims to think about, the novel would
have been a very different book and its clamorous reception
considerably less vociferous.
Even if we do not wish to make the leap from local to international so abruptly, there is still the realization that many authors
— not just novelists — face, as their work develops, new audiences through immediate translation and immediate global circulation: Iranian clerics reading a novel in English published in
London and New York, for example. For reasons that are too
tedious and perhaps well known for me to go into here, I have
had to deal with this prismatic reality on a smaller scale in my
work in the years since Orientalism was published in 1978.7 What
I had intended as a critique of the role of power in forming
European and American knowledge has been read in the Islamic
world both understandably and quite mistakenly as a defense of
Islam, the East, and oppressed people. Subsequently, I have had
to think carefully about what I say as it might be construed, say,
in Istanbul or Cairo or Teheran, and this obviously bears, albeit
imperceptibly, on what I say and how I say it. This is especially
6
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true in times of intolerance and unnaturally inflamed religious
and ideological passions. For writers whose work has now gathered the kind of international prestige that can turn into films,
innumerable articles, television interviews, and celebrity status,
its local, immediate, and existential provenance can seem like a
very irrelevant, if not entirely forgotten, matter.
What we read here in the United States is of course very different from what people in Jakarta, Lagos, or Kingston, Jamaica,
read. It is not only that the powerful absorptive capacities of the
media take in a great deal more material, but that what we think
about a writer or artistic sensibility has much more weight than
what that author’s original, local audience thinks. In much of the
non-European world, there can be an ugly tension between
internationally celebrated writers and those who have not made
it in the Eurocentric sphere that determines such things as lucrative book contracts, serialization, book clubs, and film and TV
adaptations. While most of us assume that such tension essentially derives from ressentiment on the part of lesser writers
who have not “made it,” they do, in fact, often have a point: for
who is to say, to take the example of Naguib Mahfouz, that he is
a better witness to Egypt, or a finer stylist, than, say, Yusif Idriss,
a formidably gifted fiction writer and dramatist who, until Mahfouz was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1988, was at least as well
known and as highly regarded in Egypt and the Arab-speaking
world?
The politics of international cultural exchange are, in fact,
nowhere better illustrated than in the case of Arabic. In 1990,
just as the Gulf Crisis had exploded, I wrote an article for the
Nation in which I lamented the appalling discrepancy between
the West’s knowledge of Latin American, African, and
Caribbean literature and its knowledge of Arabic literature.8
What was so irritating, I said, was that it was not a matter of
Arabic works not being available in translation, but rather of
attention in the press and among publishers and readers. For the
first time in dozens of years, many Arabic writers from
Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, Palestine, Jordan, and Saudi
Arabia were getting their work translated into English and, even
more systematically, into French. Yet you would have no way of
knowing this, since the books were never reviewed in the New
York Times, the weekly magazines, or even the literary quarter7
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lies. It was as if — for whatever reason — Arabic literature connoted trouble and was therefore relegated to silence and oblivion as far as American readers were concerned. Paradoxically,
when one writer “makes it big,” as Mahfouz did, that further
distorts the picture: Mahfouz came to represent “The Arab
Writer,” even though in many ways the stories of Zakaria
Tamer, for instance, a totally untranslated Syrian short story
writer, may in effect be more telling, more significant, and more
representative of the Arab world’s present situation than Mahfouz’s fictions.
The point of this sociology is to emphasize the way in which
such phrases and concepts as “the artistic imagination” or even
“literature” have to be passed through several filters, modifying
perspectives, and translations before they can be used with any
kind of accuracy. If we are to talk about the artistic imagination
or literature as something more than documentary evidence, we
must deal with the facts of its reception, its distribution, and its
effect from something other than the writer’s perspective, which
is likely to be made up of very different and even warring aesthetic, as well as personal and social, components. So one important question is to what extent the artistic imagination should
reflect, as opposed to resist and refuse, the writer’s local situation. Another question is whether the artistic imagination, for all
its powers and persuasions, can or should on its own deal with
the shifting images, markets, appetites, and definitions provided
by today’s international scene. Is there refuge or solace to be
taken in the particular house, or habitus, of the writer’s locale, or
has that too been dissolved in the general drift of global, internationalized markets that seek out the special, the exotic, and the
rare and make them acceptable, perhaps even domesticated?
In most societies the artist, whether as poet, novelist, dramatist, painter, musician, storyteller, or dancer, is often believed to
be exempt from the ordinary constraints of citizenship. “Oh, he
or she is an artist or poet” is a phrase often used to excuse someone like Ezra Pound, for instance, for the most appalling human
foibles. And indeed, in many ways one should be able to argue,
say, that Wagner’s music as a whole far outweighs not just the
consequences of his work in Germany, but even his own vile
pronouncements as an anti-Semite, racist, and xenophobe. An
artist’s work, however, is very different from an artist’s political
8
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behavior, although it would be extremely difficult to separate
the two at some level. They obviously overlap in ways that
make the need for what I’d like to call the critical consciousness
a very significant one. Precisely because the artistic imagination
is really privileged by virtue not just of social authority but also
because it is capable of unique vision, articulation, and invention, it needs the support of a social and political awareness that
guides the artist’s presence in the world, which constitutes his
or her worldliness. I have no intention of reducing the aesthetic
to crude, politically correct messages; on the contrary, I want to
assert the independence of the aesthetic, its relative social autonomy. But what I do want to insist on is the insufficiency of the
artistic imagination when it comes to dealing directly and analytically with politics, society, and even history. There, I think, we
need the worldliness of the secular intellectual.
II. Complements of the Intellectual
Let me begin with an example of the insufficiency I have been
referring to, tying it the general point I want to make — that on
its own, the artistic imagination needs the support, if not the
actual energies, of the intellectual to sustain itself in a world that
is as full of traps and internationalized, globalized instabilities
and inauthenticities as this one. Several years ago the remarkable J. M. Coetzee, a South African writer of genuine distinction
and stature, was invited from Capetown to go to Israel to
receive the annual Jerusalem Prize. Although he was himself not
an overtly political writer like André Brink, Nadine Gordimer,
or Bessie Head, Coetzee’s parables — Waiting for the Barbarians
and Life and Times of Michael K, to name two of his best-known
works9 — seemed in an extremely interesting way to allude to
the South African apartheid mentality, its imbalances, its social
and political deformations, and, above all, its spiritual malaise.
He arrived in Jerusalem to receive the prize in the very thick of
the Intifada; perhaps he hadn’t been aware of its happening, but
he certainly was aware that Israel had been in colonial occupation of the Palestinian territories and the Palestinian people for
more than twenty years. Moreover, Nelson Mandela (who was
still in prison at the time), as well as the ANC and most of
the other antiapartheid groups, had on numerous occasions
9
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expressed both support for the Palestinians and condemnation
of Israeli practices, which, as so many had remarked, bore a
strong resemblance to South African apartheid. Despite this,
Coetzee gave a speech, subsequently published in a collection of
his essays called Doubling the Point,10 that eloquently made reference to the Holocaust and to the travails of apartheid without
once mentioning the existence less than a mile from where he
stood of a Palestinian “problem.” To me and to many other of
Coetzee’s numerous Palestinian friends and admirers, the omission was shocking.
Now, precisely because I do not think we should expect the
artistic imagination to be able to do or say anything, we need the
services of the secular intellectual as a corrective standard for
what the artistic imagination cannot do. One reason for the
insufficiency is that most artists write or perform from, as well
as for, their local audiences first, and only secondarily for the
global market, which may or may not accept their views exactly
because their political and intellectual commitments are inconvenient, embarrassing, or too severe. Jean Genet is today read as
a playwright with a scandalously inventive, even violent, imagination, oblivious of social conventions and traditions; yet very
few of his readers are prepared to take on his views about the
Black Panthers or the Palestinians with the same degree of interest, just because those views remain as unaccommodated, as
socially difficult as ever. For that reason much of Genet’s political writing remains untranslated or is not easily available. The
same may be true of Juan Goytisolo, a courageous explorer of
socially problematic terrain who is also a brilliant novelist and
essayist. Part of what makes the Rushdie case so complex is that
after The Satanic Verses, it was the very constituency he had long
written for and defended as pamphleteer and essayist in England — Muslim immigrants from the subcontinent — that led the
fight against him and his book.
Or take the case of V. S. Naipaul, a gifted and disturbing
writer who has accompanied his fiction with a dozen books of
nonfiction, most of them earning him the reputation in the formerly colonized world of being an enemy of that world and its
people. Among the Believers, written a decade ago, is (in my opinion) a lamentable book about Islam in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution, and while a certain amount of what he says has
10

04/18/96 3:53 PM

1880sai2.qxd

Edward W. Said

some truth to it, the portrait of the whole that he presents is shot
through with the worst prejudices and ignorant mythologizing
of “Islam” — surely an almost unusable term these days — that
one can encounter.11 Read alongside, let us say, A Bend in the
River, an extremely skillful novel that contains flashes of considerable brilliance, Naipaul’s Islamic book seems derived from the
same imaginative core: a virulent distrust of mass movements
among people colonized and oppressed for years by Western
powers, and now trying (often comically and desperately) both
to make up for the past and to set a new course for the future.12
Naipaul is not only unmoved by this, he actively detests it,
whether it appears in an East African Black or Indian, or in a
Pakistani or Iranian shopkeeper.
But it is certainly the case, however, that a novelist is not
meant to be an analytic thinker, even though in his nonfiction
Naipaul does present as well as argue his views about the
Caribbean or India systematically and with great thoroughness.
Reading Naipaul, I have always regretted the absence in his
work about the Third World of any compassion or historical
understanding, especially of the kind that is premised on a nonEurocentric notion of history and values. The great authority
and prestige of a celebrated artist is, in Naipaul’s case, unfairly
enlisted on the side of the strong and powerful, not the weak
and disadvantaged. What Naipaul can do in his work is to give
space to the unheard voices of this world, but because he is
actively opposed to what they stand for, his representations of
them, skillfully embedded in fiction of a very polished kind, can
do them even more damage than their silence. I recall that when
A Bend in the River appeared in 1979, it got an adulatory frontpage review in the Sunday New York Times Book Review by Irving
Howe, plus a reverential portrait of the man (on the same front
page) by Elizabeth Hardwick.13 Both stressed the opinion that
here at last was an honest opinion of the Third World done by
someone who, after all, was of that world and therefore knew
what he was talking about. Thus was the artistic imagination
coopted into ideological service. That the New York Times had
never been exactly supportive of Third World leaders and
scarcely needed the boost given it by Naipaul, Howe, and Hardwick was never mentioned.

11
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It would be folly to deny, however, that other novelists —
Anita Desai, Rushdie, Mahfouz,
Oe¯ Kenzabur¯
o, Nadine Gordimer,
Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Achebe, and several others — were, in fact,
actively engaged in improving as well as humanizing our
understanding of otherwise forgotten or unknown histories and
geographies. They have been; but, I think, that job is an adjunct
to their main business as artists, artists whose role is, as
Gordimer says, to enact, render, embody human life, and only
secondarily to deal directly with the ideas, analyses, values, and
declarations out of which intellectuals make their work. I would
go so far as to say that the artistic imagination at some very profound level actually resists abstract ideas and arguments: it is
consumed, rather, with the need to express itself in figures and
configurations that inhabit a different sphere than that of
abstract discourse and clashing ideas. Both artists and intellectuals confront “the terrible ambiguity of an immediate experience,” but whereas the intellectual tries to mute the ambiguity
and highlight its prosaic meaning, the artistic imagination must,
I believe, somehow preserve its irreducible complexity with
immediacy and metaphor.
So whether the artistic imagination resists or facilitates intellectual and political understanding of the complicated global situation we are in today is not the main point of the aesthetic
work itself. Hence, yet again, the need for a clear intellectual
articulation of the political and moral issues that stand beyond,
just beyond reach of, the aesthetic work, issues which the work
very often engages on its own terrain. For if we are to allow the
work of art the kind of autonomy it requires — despite the
hybridization of forms, the influence of mass media, including
film, and the ubiquity of political discourse even in the work
itself — we cannot expect artists on their own to do more than
they can. Now, I am not happy with dividing artistic from intellectual energies so neatly, nor do I believe that they finally act
independently of each other, since, as Antonio Gramsci says at
the very beginning of his notes on the intellectual, everyone
with an intellect is an intellectual. But he does go on salutarily to
add that not everyone has the function of an intellectual. It is this
function that I now want to discuss as working at the outer limits of the work of art, although, of course, I have no wish to suggest either that the aesthetic has no political or social relevance,
12
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or that the intellectual work has no component of the artistic
imagination in it. I am making the distinction here mostly to
highlight the separate social and political status of intellectuals,
their discourse, and their mode of being: it should be kept in
mind that in my view, however, the secular intellectual and the
artistic imagination exist in a complementary relationship. Both
are performances that are essential to an era of globalization and
rapid, often bewildering, change.
III. The Reason of the Intellectual
Intellectuals and ideas about intellectuals have never been so
much in evidence as during the twentieth century. In the last
few years alone, we have had such various and attention-getting
accounts of intellectual life, considered as something distinct
from other sorts of life, as (to name a small handful) Irving
Howe’s autobiography; the massive biography of Hannah
Arendt by Elizabeth Bruehl-Young; William Barret’s revisionist
memoir of the early Partisan Review intellectuals; Simone de
Beauvoir’s recollections of her last years with Sartre; Russell
Jacoby’s book; and Carol Brightman’s biography of Mary
McCarthy. Right across the political spectrum, from radical to
conservative, there has also been a series of studies of the intellectual in modern life, from Noam Chomsky’s pioneering series,
beginning with American Power and the New Mandarins and climaxing with Towards a New Cold War, Manufacturing Consent,
Necessary Illusions, and Deterring Democracy, and Alvin Gouldner’s The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class, to, in
the supposedly value-free social science center of the controversy, the work of such people as Edward Shils, Peter Berger,
Raymond Aron, and others, all of them following in the tradition of Karl Mannheim, himself a depoliticized follower of
Lukács and Max Weber. On the rightward side, there have been
innumerable essays and books by and about conservatives and
neoconservatives, from policy-makers like Zbigniew Brzezinski
to academics and quasi-academics like Daniel Bell, Robert Nisbet, Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz (whose assertion that he
and George Orwell are fundamentally the same may strike us as
a little quaint, not to say inappropriate), Paul Hollander, Peter
Steinfels, and many others.
13
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Most of this work, on the right, left, and center, is indebted to
the extraordinary cultural ferment early in this century that
came out of trying to make sense of the relationship tying the
activities of mind to the activities of society. Stuart Hughes’s
book Consciousness and Society14 lays out the fundamental questions and sketches the careers of major European thinkers who
entered the arena, and Lionel Trilling’s Mind in the Modern
World15 brings those earlier reflections autumnally and mournfully up to date. One thinks here inevitably of the crystallizations of thought and positions precipitated in the nineteenth
century by the Dreyfus Affair, just as the Sacco-Vanzetti, Alger
Hiss, and Rosenberg cases played a similar role for U.S. intellectuals up to the middle of this century. One thinks also of such
towering protagonists as Antonio Gramsci — to whom I shall
return in a little while — György Lukács, and Theodor Adorno,
for all of whom the intellectual was the very center of political
analysis and, in Gramsci’s case, of action. Then we must, in
addition, recognize the importance not only of Karl Mannheim
and Max Weber, but of Julien Benda, whose La Trahison des
Clercs, published in 1927, defined the notion of an intellectual
vocation with a force and a conviction that, as I shall try to
demonstrate, is still powerfully resonating and intellectually
compelling.16
If, in addition, we mention such European names as Orwell,
Silone, Merleau-Ponty, Koestler, and Sartre, and if we think of
such debates, causes célèbres, and issues as the battle over Stalinism, the question of anticommunism, anti-anticommunism,
McCarthyism, the status of liberalism, and the whole matter of
loyalty and the questions connected to it of recantation or of
informing as investigated by Victor Navasky, we will, I think,
begin to have an idea of how vast and how dense is the field
occupied by intellectuals and by intellectual debate all over the
world as subjects of activities intrinsically important as well as
distinct from other topics of social or political concern.
Now it would be perfectly possible to argue that the entire
history of the nineteenth-century West can be understood in one
very crucial way as deriving from the gradually increasing role
of the intellectual in society, and that this began to be both evident and compelling in the case of the Enlightenment philosophers, the legacy of whose ideas and careers thereafter informs
revolutionary as well as counterrevolutionary cultures, states,
14
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and associations. Of course, the way in which the intellectuals’
role was enhanced and increased in influence was far from simple. A great many developments occurred during the nineteenth
century to transform the intellectual from being someone who,
in Lewis Coser’s phrase, was a man or woman of ideas to
becoming such disparate things as (according to Marx) an ideologist, (according to Arnold) a man of culture, (according to
Humboldt) a humanist, and (according to Nietzsche) a teacher
and philologist. Intellectuals become associated or affiliated
with administration, with bureaucracies, with colonial rule,
with universities, and even with the church (Newman) during
the nineteenth century, in ways that were unthinkable during,
say, Voltaire’s age. James Joll’s book Three Intellectuals in Politics17
takes the intellectual squarely into politics with its account of
Léon Blum, Walther Rathenau, and Marinetti; despite its elegance and insight, however, one wishes for some acknowledgment beyond habitual Eurocentrism that non-European
intellectuals—Fanon, Shariati, C. L. R. James, Kanafani—played
even more impressive roles. They, like Tagore, Iqbal, Yeats,
Neruda, Césaire, and Faiz (to name only a handful), play a crucial role in the culture of nationalism and the foundation of the
postcolonial nation-state.
In addition, the formation of different kinds of intellectuals
during the nineteenth century varies tremendously from country to country. The Russian intelligentsia, as portrayed so memorably by Turgenev and Dostoyevsky, was different in its
interests and activities from that group of Victorian English
sages that includes Mill and Ruskin, and, of course, as Madame
de Staël was one of the first to recognize, a wide gap separated
German scholars and thinkers from their French and Swiss
counterparts.
In the twentieth century, these national and cultural differences are on the whole much more dramatic, especially if we
expand our interest—as we must, I think—to include intellectuals in the non-European world, as well as those who live in exile
between two or more worlds, as cosmopolitans or expatriates.
To compare two works that are almost exactly contemporary
with each other, Abdullah Laroui’s Crisis of the Arab Intellectuals
and Alvin Gouldner’s study of the new Western intellectuals,
The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class,18 is to real15

04/18/96 3:53 PM

1880sai2.qxd

Macalester International

Vol. 3

ize the enormous disparity between activities and concerns that
in both instances are called intellectual. For Laroui, the Arab
intellectual is centrally concerned with the reinterpretation of
tradition and of inherited classical culture (al-turath); and this
revisionist work is, says Laroui, conducted against a background of Western domination of the Arab world, a reinvigoration of Islamic values, and the crisis of identity engendered by
such things as dependence, neocolonialism, Orientalism, and a
new self-image. For Gouldner, the intellectual is a member of a
rising class whose hegemony over the old monied and propertied class is practically assured. In Gouldner’s postindustrial
world, intellectual production has replaced industrial production, as, indeed, Fritz Machlup’s studies — which show that
more than 60 percent of the GNP today is furnished by knowledge-related production —seem to bear up.
If we add to these contrasting styles the role of African intellectuals in postcolonial African societies, or of Chinese intellectuals in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution and Tiananmen
Square, or of Latin American intellectuals concerned by the
dynamic of democracy, dependence, and independence, we
have a much more exact notion of how generalizations about the
intellectual’s or humanist’s role in modern society tend to be
tenuous and fairly crude, even though there is now a worldwide
phenomenon of intellectuals. For even within particular cultural
formations, the conceptions of the intellectual mission are
widely divergent.
What is worth noting, however, is that many intellectual
debates took place (and, in the non-European world, continue to
take place) in conjunction with efforts by literary artists to
understand the history and dynamics of their societies. Yeats,
for example, is only partially understood as a poet; his poetic
oeuvre is fully engaged in the debates about Irish politics, the
Irish language, and the future of Ireland that make up the great
cultural revival of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. And this, in turn, presages the founding of the Irish state
and the republican movement.
Nothing, however, is quite as disturbing and yet inevitable as
ranks of intellectuals arrayed against each other in the service of
nationalisms, creeds, states, parties, or causes at war with
opposing nationalisms, creeds, states, parties, and causes. Such
16
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conflicts are a fact of cultural life since cultures plus intellectuals
became self-conscious of themselves and of each other. But, as
Benda correctly remarks, never before the nineteenth century
had the wholesale participation of intellectuals in these conflicts
been so great. The conscriptive powers of the state and, in our
own country, of the corporation and the party are enormous, as
are, of course, the resources of the contemporary media as those
have been characterized by scholars like Herbert Schiller and
Armand Mattelart. Given those realities, it is not so surprising to
find intellectuals so deeply and lucratively involved in what
Benda calls the organization of collective passions; although
with Benda, I am strongly inclined to deplore this involvement
and that sort of intellectual performance during periods such as
the Gulf War. This is, alas, routinely the case during wartime, as
Carol Gruber’s depressing Mars and Minerva, a study of American intellectuals during World War I, reveals in detail.19 As for
the use of intellectuals in such occupations as spying, intelligence gathering, and psychological warfare, there, too, we find a
wide spread of opinion and performances, some thinkers stressing the necessity (perhaps only the illusion) of intellectual aloofness, others the intellectual’s unquestioning loyalty to the
national or nationalist cultural cause.
But perhaps this rapid survey of a little history and some
peculiarly intellectual dilemmas is enough for now. Let me go
on to isolate a few things in all this that strike me as having special relevance to the role of the secular intellectual in a globalized cultural setting. I should say at the outset that I do not plan
to present a universal theory of how intellectuals behave, of how
in a Kantian sense they ought to behave, or of what general role
they play in different societies and histories. What I want to concentrate on is a series of questions, all of them in some way leading us back to Benda’s La Trahison des Clercs, originally
published in 1928 and republished after World War II (1955), in
order to take account of intellectual behavior under, as well as
after, fascism.
I will not try to summarize Benda here, much less to assess
the book systematically. What I want to do is to recall the fact
that Benda’s book put to intellectuals a very uncompromising
challenge, one that can, in fact, be put also to the artistic imagination, although it is the intellectuals’ role to engage directly
17
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with the challenge. As intellectuals, he said, as people whose
interests are not determined by profit or mundane transitory
effect, you should devote yourselves to transcendental, transnational virtue, as did Jesus, Socrates, Voltaire, or Renan. Can you
do so, or are you, like most of your company, condemned to the
organization of political hatred whose logical end, Benda says
with startling severity, is nothing less than the organized
slaughter of nations and classes?
Everyone who reads Benda and who does not immediately
dismiss him as either too provincial or too absolute — for Benda
seems uninterested in or untouched by the role of ideology in
determining values, and he seems totally oblivious of anything
other than Europe and European values — surely comes away
with a feeling of mixed confusion and disquiet. At least this is
his continuing effect on me, even though it is quite easy to find
other writers, like Gramsci, for example, in whose work the
characterization of intellectuals is far more subtle than Benda’s.
Benda’s effect at bottom is to stimulate in us the whole problem
of what it means — and how difficult it is — to be a real intellectual, a problem that is not central to the artistic imagination at
work. When he says that the intellectual must uphold a given set
of unchanging values, he is saying that the intellectual’s vocation is accomplished not only by identifying and referring to
those values, but by sticking to them no matter how many practical punishments and rewards are likely to result. The oppression of human beings, thus, is not only believed to be unjust; it
must always be declared unjust, even though a national or patriotic mood makes such a declaration tantamount to treason. To
disguise oppression by saying that it is not occurring, or to say
that as a professional Milton or Shakespeare scholar, or a poet or
novelist, it is not my concern, or simply to be expediently silent
about it: these are betrayals of the intellectual vocation that
Benda finds equally dishonorable and equally unacceptable.
As I stated earlier, Benda is too provincial, too absolute, and
too confident to be taken literally. Moreover, he doesn’t at all
discuss the problem of how intellectuals possessed of the right
values and sense of mission can make their force as intellectuals
felt; he seems unconcerned by the problems of effectiveness, of
instrumentality of coherence, persuasion, or rhetoric. He is no
help at all when it comes to what we liberals like to call a com18
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plex situation, a phrase, by the way, that too often is a rhetorical
signal given before a lie is to be pronounced, or when a grave
and immoral complicity with injustice is about to be covered up.
But Benda’s strength is obviously that he seems to know and
feel what intellectuals should do and what they should stand
for, whereas those of us — like myself — who find him stodgy,
inflexible, and not skeptical enough are immediately set adrift in
a sea of questions and doubts that cannot easily be resolved.
Then you start to realize how very insidiously Benda’s argument in La Trahison des Clercs preempts and, in a sense, defines
the uneven and inconsistent terrain for anyone attempting to
understand the intellectual’s role. For if we say that Benda is too
obsessed with consistency of values and performance, we must
also be prepared to say which sorts of inconsistency are acceptable, which are not, and by what standards. What is an allowable discrepancy between, for example, an abhorrence of human
violence and the patriotic imperative to rally round the flag in a
time of national need in which war is being advocated?
Benda, in short, stimulates a large number of questions, particularly for those of us who profess humanism and historically
based scholarship, as well as artists who are members of
national groups and cultures. I do not think that these questions
can be deflected by saying that, in a strict sociological sense,
they ought only to concern moral philosophers, political
activists, and religious teachers. While it is true that different
audiences demand different articulations, and that to write novels is not the same as writing pamphlets, every one of us —
artists not least — has an intellectual consciousness, a moral
sense, a civil role to play. Therefore, we should try to see what
happens if we take Benda’s tract seriously, and we ought to
begin by asking the kinds of questions pertinent to our own
social, intellectual, and historical situation. Because one wishes
to be a dedicated poet, or academic scholar, or doctor or lawyer,
is it enough to consider one’s responsibility as an intellectual
outside the academy or profession or the field of art thereby
taken care of? My contention here is that an understanding of
the history and politics of one’s own time, and one’s role in both
as an intellectual, is a necessary first step toward being a critical,
engaged intellectual, not someone who just does one job. It is
this relationship, then, between the public role of the intellectual
19
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and the intellectual’s professional or disciplinary role, even if
that role is that of artist, that is sustained by what I’d like to call
an intellectual vocation.
There is first the question of secular power: what is and what
ought to be the intellectual’s relationship to the essentially conservative power of the state, the party, the corporation? What is
the relationship between the intellectual and social change? Second, what does it mean to be consistent as an intellectual, that is,
to avoid the betrayal of which Benda speaks? Lastly, what is or
ought to be the intellectual’s capacity for or attitude toward the
truth? Is there truth, or, so far as the intellectual in society is concerned, is the truth always relative, ideological, or constituted
by narrowly defined interests?
One of the most striking things about the archive of modern
experience is the extent to which the pursuit of scholarship and
knowledge is bound up with things that we do not commonly
admit are associated with knowledge or truth, such things as
power, the state, and money. This would not be so dramatic a
revelation for anyone who had read Marx, Nietzsche, or Freud
in an uncompromising way. The trouble is that for most humanists, the professional guild inculcates an opposite belief, the
dogma that because the life of scholarship, for example, is carried out with protestations about humanism, objectivity, and
taste, it therefore follows that knowledge is free of what we
might call social affiliations and worldly circumstances. The
same argument is made about art, that it has nothing to do with
politics. These are comforting, not to say flattering, beliefs to
hold on to, but are quite easily dissipated when looked at more
closely. Certainly the history of Western scholarship about
exotic places and peoples is extraordinarily tied up with such
things as religious ideology, with the conquest of territory, with
colonial trade, with the subjugation of people and the administration of territories. This is still the case today in so-called area
studies programs, as well as social science and humanistic curricula in the universities, yet very few people, and certainly not
enough intellectuals, are willing to consider, much less look critically at, the effect of powerful interests upon the production of
knowledge and upon what Habermas calls interest-constituted
knowledge, intellectual activity carried on under the aegis of
considerable state, ideological, and corporate pressure.
20
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One of the broader and, in my mind, most interesting questions I confronted in studying the institutional way in which the
Orient was perceived in Europe and the United States over the
past two centuries is the constitutive role of power in determining knowledge. Early modern scholars like William Jones and
Silvestre de Sacy might have been able to do their work in spite
of the two great empires that they served, respectively, but their
work certainly would have been far less impressive if, for example, England did not administer India and if France did not
house manuscripts brought there by colonial officers. A generation later, by the middle of the nineteenth century, university
researchers of Sanskrit or of Persian poetry existed all across
Europe — how could they be said to be made possible by European imperialism? Part of the answer is that we cannot know
what these scholars would have done if there were no empires
to provide them with resources; the other part of the answer is
that knowledge production is always influenced, or constituted
and sustained by, interests, and interests run the full gamut
from actual possession to imaginative or fantasized appropriation.
Thus, if we were to compare European scholarship about the
Orient with, say, Islamic scholarship about Europe during the
same period, we would discover how in the first case European
scholars were more wide-ranging, more patient, more detailed
and detached from their subject matter because they could
afford to be, since their culture was in a position of relative
strength. Whereas in the second case, Muslims would be defensive and anxious, studying Europe for what they could learn
about its perceived strength and technological modernity,
which was invading and threatening their societies. And these
attitudes, European and non-European in turn, define the position of the intellectual, who, because Europe was so powerful
relative to the Orient, assumed more various and differentiated
roles — professor, administrator, scholar, essayist, traveler,
memoirist, novelist — whereas in the Orient, especially in the
Arab world, their counterparts were almost always either direct
servants of power or translators, interpreting the West for the
benefit of the ruler, and then helping the ruler — both secular
and religious — to decide how to defend against the West or to
adapt some of its ways very selectively.
21
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The point here is perhaps the obvious one, that no one in a
society can be isolated from power and the institutions, discourses, and individuals who represent power; certainly I think
a very wide range of analysts agree on this point, including
Marx, Arnold, Gramsci, Foucault, C. Wright Mills, and many
others. The thing that I find puzzling is that so many humanistic
intellectuals today — the people described by a recent Trilateral
Commission study, The Crisis of Democracy,20 as traditional intellectuals (those concerned with values), as opposed to policy or
technocratic intellectuals (those concerned with decision-making) — insistently and hectoringly distance themselves from precisely those things that make possible their existence as
functioning intellectuals, namely the corporations, the government, the managerial class, and the whole apparatus of cultural
production, from the journalist to the ticket seller and impresario, thereby pretending that they are objective.
In any event, whatever goes on inside such intellectual professions as humanistic studies, it is true to say that the overall
picture in most modern societies is very much under the influence of specialization and the guild consciousness. This is certainly a globalized phenomenon not limited to the Western
world. Peter Nettl characterizes the situation as follows:
Why is the intellectual increasingly being pushed from the battlefield and being put to flight? . . . As bureaucratic modernity
advances, the intellectual retreats. For one thing, universality is
no longer regarded as a validation of intellectual status but as an
arrogant and unjustifiable claim, at best the stigma of the dilettante. In a world of growing specialization too wide-ranging
interests may be an amiable eccentricity but no longer qualify
him to speak with authority. Instead, respect and competence
come not from universal, Aristotelian wisdom but rather from
detailed knowledge and technical qualifications. The right to
speak with authority is no longer inherent but has become an
external attribute which is attached to a person like abbreviated
titles of degrees after a name . . . . Since one cannot know everything, intellectuals who do wish to speak with authority on the
wide range of social phenomena must increasingly go in for a
severe form of reductionism. Hence we find that today’s intellectuals increasingly concentrate on what they hold to be the one
dominant aspect of life . . . . But reductionism is only one rather
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feeble response to modern complexity — one, moreover, that carries less and less conviction as a form of explanation or prediction. The intellectual is being winkled out of the crevasses of his
social and political concerns. Politics — the arena par excellence of
dashing ideas and normative conflict — is itself becoming a specialized business with its own professional qualifications . . . persuasion has little part in [the type of politics implicit in the notion
of the rational-scientific society] except as a means of teasing
resources out of the invisible men in government. And this type
of persuasion, the political scientists keep telling us, is no amateur business of “mere” convictions nowadays but a highly
skilled technical affair of lobbying and fixing. Problems of right
and wrong in politics are much less relevant, at least in the actual
political process . . . . Modern American political life is thus
divided into rather unequal halves; the power processes of organized pressure, policy, and action, and the individual’s inalienable right to express an opinion. Societies which imprison people
for their opinions at least do them the service of ascribing influence to such opinions which seems almost flattering by comparison!21

Unlike Nettl, however, Foucault thinks that the specialized
intellectual is potentially not a marginal creature, but someone
who exists at the intersection of various interests and powers,
and can therefore be effective as an agent of social change. I am
not convinced by this argument. Specialists tend to become
more specialized, the rewards — say for expertise in one or
another area of foreign relations, of humanistic scholarship, or
social policy, or for that matter for writing novels or literary
essays — become more attainable and definite, the impulse to be
interested in change is consequently diminished. Gramsci’s distinction between organic and traditional intellectuals strikes me
as more valid, and a more accurate way of understanding the
present situation. Organic intellectuals are directly associated
with a class; they organize its interests, create fields of consensus
and acceptability, and they make it prevail. A brilliant analysis
of this last function is to be found in the work that Herbert
Schiller produced in, as well as after, The Mind Managers,22 which
is an account of the way the media produces visions of reality
permitting manipulation and social control unique to the great
industrial democracies like the United States.
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Gramsci’s other class of intellectual is the traditional intellectual, that individual who fulfills unchanging functions such as
those of a teacher, priest, or bureaucrat. Traditional intellectuals
are not less affiliated with classes and interests than are organic
intellectuals; it is just that the traditional intellectual holds on to
territory already conquered, whereas the organic intellectual is
opening up new territory usually in connection with an ascendant class or movement.
These distinctions are, in the final analysis, analytic distinctions, since in practice the organic intellectual of one generation
becomes the traditional intellectual of another. Consider Arnold.
When he wrote Culture and Anarchy in 1868, he was writing
against a background of agitation for the second Reform Act, of
the Hyde Park Riots, and of Irish unrest.23 His tract, then, was an
aggressive assertion of middle-class values in which the task of
making culture and the will of God, i.e., the State, prevail
against the working class was to be undertaken by the men of
culture, i.e., disaffected middle-class social aliens like himself.
He wrote as an organic intellectual of a possessing and ascendant class. Subsequently, however, he has been read as a traditional intellectual, and Culture and Anarchy is regarded and
analyzed as a document praising the virtues of humanistic education, or scholarship and literacy. Culture for Arnold had been
a practical instrument for quelling civil unrest and extending
hegemony by consent and rational persuasion. In time it became
the possession of a guild sustaining itself in a particular way, in
a particular situation, with a particular discourse of its own.
Gramsci’s distinction between organic and traditional intellectuals is much better known than another distinction he makes
in a letter written from prison in 1931:
17 August 1931:
It seemed to me that I and Umberto Cosmo, and many other
intellectuals at this time [say the first fifteen years of the century]
occupied a certain common ground: we were all to some degree
part of the movement of moral and intellectual reform which in
Italy stemmed from Benedetto Croce, and whose first premise
was that modern man can and should live without the help of
religion, positivist religion, mythological religion, or whatever
brand one cares to name. This point appears to me even today to
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be the major contribution made to international culture by modern Italian intellectuals, and it seems to me a civil conquest that
must not be lost.24

Although Gramsci does not name this class of Croce-inspired
intellectuals, he clearly has in mind what we might call secular
intellectuals whose moment in Weber’s terminology was “the
disenchantment of the world,” people who accept no reductionist scheme of things, thinkers for whom the closures and comforts of revealed truths were unacceptable, individuals whose
weapons were essentially criticism and humanistic rationalism
as opposed to dogmatic authority and unquestioning assent.
Vico is a model for Gramsci as he puts forward this notion of the
intellectual. The secular critical intellectual is clearly an oppositional figure within civil society, as the phrase “civil conquest”
in Gramsci’s letter seems to indicate, that is, an intellectual
whose efforts are expended in opposition to the traditional institutions that dominate civil society. Thus, borrowing from Raymond Williams, we can go on to say that the secular intellectual
performs an alternative activity in society, given that the modern realities of mass societies in the developed, and postcolonial,
world are so dominant in their regulating power vis-à-vis the
individual that they occupy the place formerly held by ecclesiastical authority and revelation. Yet, Williams says,
However dominant a social system may be, the very meaning of
its domination involves a limitation or selection of the activities
it covers, so that by definition it cannot exhaust all social experience, which therefore always potentially contains space for
alternative acts and alternative intentions which are not yet articulated as a social institution or even project.25

The secular and critical intellectual therefore exists in order to
articulate those alternative acts and intentions in a society
whose collective national identity exists to coerce, rule, and control in small matters as well as large a practice that tends to
reduce and mystify consciousness into depoliticized acceptance,
placidity, and passivity.
A book by Joan Cocks, The Oppositional Imagination: Feminism,
Critique, and Political Theory, develops these ideas of Williams
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and others into a full-fledged theory of intellectual resistance to
the dominant order.26 Gramsci’s “pessimism of the intellect” is
found by Cocks to be one of the sources of opposition to the
dominant order; that is, there is always a dominant order and
any analysis of that has to posit the extreme difficulty of standing outside it, changing it, perhaps even finally defeating it. The
difference, however, between my generation and Gramsci’s is
that for us now in the United States there appears to be only the
system variously celebrated as free-market, free-trade capitalism, or, in Joseph Nye’s more sanguine philosophy, as keeping
America number one and bound to lead. Despite the apocalyptic
triumphalism of “the end of history,” it is perfectly obvious that
the problems of race, gender, class, and economic inequality
persist domestically and on a world scale. Few oppositional
intellectuals today — and I include such formidably capable figures as Chomsky — are possessed of a total alternative vision to
the current state of affairs. We are left with fairly specific sites of
oppositional activity — the written intervention and lecture platform, the alternative media, the environmental movement, some
churches, informal networks, oppositional groups — where we
might hope to mount a resistance to such catastrophes as imperialist war, pervasive ideological racism, ecological defacements,
and abuses. Deterrent power is hardly there (witness the
absence of any effective mass resistance to the Gulf War, with its
media-manufactured consensus) and organization nonexistent.
IV. The Intellectual Vocation
Beyond the general situation I have sketched, one needs to analyze particular relationships between intellectuals and power in
specific social, historical, and political configurations; what is
relevant to an American intellectual during the nineties, for
example, is not relevant for an Arab or Japanese intellectual during the same period. But I do think one always-present element
is the question of complicity or collaboration, which I have ventured to formulate as the secular intellectual’s vocation: to provide a critical alternative to the prevailing orthodoxy, which
always exists and is always in a position of dominance. In the
formerly colonized world, the return of nativism and religion is
a particular threat to secular life, especially in the part of the
26
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globe I know best, the Arab world. Yet, I think, there is a central
distinction to be drawn between media and even “expert”
attacks on official “enemies” like Islamic fundamentalism or terrorism, crude and ultimately self-serving labels, and the often
impressive internal debate about Islam within Islamic societies,
a debate concerning women’s issues, secularism, democratic
freedom, and tradition. Little of this is reported in the West, but
it takes place and complicates, perhaps even improves, a generally depressing picture.
To return to recantation, which is given one of its most powerful aesthetic forms in Brecht’s Galileo,27 one supposes that it is
frequently a function of greater age and maturity; what we are
for in our youth, those radical passions and political enthusiasms that must surely have inspired each of us, seem destined to
be replaced not only by what seems superficially to be a brave
disenchantment but also, amongst intellectuals in particular, by
a need to advertise the change. One thinks immediately of The
God That Failed,28 or, to bring it more up to date, the case of many
who felt that U.S. policy in Vietnam or Iran was disastrous, but
who now feel that what took place there after U.S. intervention
ended is catastrophic, and hence a need sets in to denounce the
past, revise values, and reconsider the virtues of U.S. interventionism, as occurred during the Gulf War. But, as E. P.
Thompson has argued, there is a great difference between disenchantment and apostasy, for he suggests that “[t]here is a . . . creative . . . tension between a boundless aspiration — for liberty,
reason, egalité, perfectibility — and a peculiarly harsh and unregenerate reality.”29 Out of that conflict there comes intellectual as
well as moral and aesthetic creativity; their sources are the same.
But to turn against aspiration and denounce oneself is, Thompson continues, “self-bowdlerization . . . an imaginative failure
because it involves forgetting — or manipulating improperly —
the authenticity of experience: a mutilation of the writer’s own
previous existential being.”30 If as secular intellectuals we cannot
condone anything that warps the spirit, punishes the body, or
destroys the community, then we cannot turn away from these
values simply because they no longer seem expedient, because
situations seemed to have changed, and, most important of all,
because we are accommodating to the status quo. As Hazlitt put
it in his essay “On Consistency of Opinion,” “[One] need not . . .
27

04/18/96 3:53 PM

1880sai2.qxd

Macalester International

Vol. 3

pass an act of attainder on all his thoughts, hopes, wishes, from
youth upwards, to offer them at the shrine of matured servility;
he need not become one vile antithesis, a living and ignominious
satire on himself.”31
The last of Benda’s challenges is the question of truth. Put as
simply and clearly as I can put it, it is to ask whether secular
intellectuals can or ought to uphold a unitary standard of morality and truth. We need to concede at the outset that mere silence
or a deferral of opinion on a given question is unacceptable, that
the secular intellectual as I have been describing him or her is
committed to the articulation of alternatives, and that professional competence or artistic license is not the issue when it
comes to those matters which Benda avers are the intellectuals’
domain, questions of values, of justice, of truth.
There is a dramatic moment in the encounter between Foucault and Chomsky on Dutch television in 1972, where their
positions are so diametrically opposed as to be irreconcilable.
Chomsky says that as an intellectual he is moved to struggle
because of a belief, however implicit and difficult to define with
precision, in the possibility of justice; Chomsky solicits the help
of what C. S. Peirce calls abduction, the use of all the empirical
or experiential data available as a spur to imaginative projection
beyond the data. Foucault says that all ideas of justice are functions of a situation, and what may seem like an absolute idea of
justice “is an idea which in effect has been invented and put to
work in different types of societies as an instrument of a certain
political and economic power or as a weapon against that
power. But it seems to me that, in any case, the notion of justice
itself functions within a society of classes as a claim made by the
oppressed class and as justification for it.”32
I shall not try to draw out the differences further, nor will I
suggest why I think that Chomsky’s is more a tenable and interesting position. I am, however, interested in remarking on the
rhetoric of justice — for example, in Michael Walzer’s book Just
and Unjust Wars,33 which serves in reality to certify as just those
instances of war with which the author happens to be in sympathy. What we have in such cases is the intellectual reproducing a
system of values — reproducing it in Pierre Bourdieu’s sense of
the word — while claiming to be doing the opposite. The contamination of much intellectual discourse with the silent repro28
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duction of unquestioned values associated with the status quo
— most of it in the name not only of neoconservatism but of
decent liberalism — has turned a large segment of the intelligentsia into therapists for the state and for power in our societies.
I think that we must conceive of the secular intellectual not as
an authority — a fixed personality magisterially pronouncing
truths in recognized accents — but as an everlasting effort, an
unendingly vigilant, prompt, energetic, and reflective activity,
an unstoppable energy. There is no given freedom, Sartre says,
which is to say that it must be won, in general and in detail. No
area, no person, no value is automatically privileged, none
spared the scrutiny of intellectual examination. As for freedom
here, it is, as I implied earlier, relative to the absolute and totalizing impingements of systems, bureaucracies, organized passions, corporations, nations, and tribe-consensuses.
In sum, then, the secular intellectual cannot be defined, his or
her activities prescribed, his or her place fixed. We are dealing
instead with a constant activity, which to fix with definitions
and nomenclatures is to destroy precisely what gives it value.
On behalf of what, and in whose interests? There are no simple
answers because, in keeping with Sartre’s reminder that eternal
values are fleshless, those very things to be struggled for by secular intellectuals can be defined and discovered only in the act
of surmounting obstacles and overcoming resistance in specifically concrete zones, contested sites, issues. Certainly one can
posit minimal goals to be kept in mind, abuses to be condemned; when we say “freedom” we mean the minimum of
coercion, freedom of thought and expression, the possibility of
community, the absence of violence against individuals or ethnic, religious, and national minorities, crimes of state terror and
nationalist complicity and/or silence. But for the intellectual
these things are either instigations to action, or final goals to be
achieved: they do not tell us enough how a secular intellectual is
when in action.
—————————
I shall propose six overlapping and intersecting axes of activity
and thought for secular intellectuals, and these, I believe, pro29
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vide the substance and the life of an intellectual vocation. They
by no means exhaust, however, what it is, that such intellectuals
are and do; rather, they provide a complex and uneven terrain
in which intellectual work can be situated and contextualized, as
well as reflected upon. Underlying these axes are two assumptions: one, that the intellectual exists to provide alternative acts
and intentions in an age when the state and mass organizations
aspire to domination on a level increasing, rather than diminishing, with time; and two, that the intellectual’s oppositional activity begins, but does not end with, his or her immediate social
location. The impingements of guilds, ethnicity, nation, and
even race have provided intellectuals with what can only be
called a structure of apologetic compromise, the essence of
which is to excuse abuses at home (or in your camp) for which
you are responsible, in the interests of attacks on a consensus
enemy, or praises for a consensus friend. There can be no compromise for the intellectual on fundamental matters of principle.
Of these matters, the most important by far is testifying to the
truth about organized state violence — violence against individuals, classes, subject populations — especially when such violence is totally hidden by the rhetoric of denouncing an
approved enemy.
Thus, these six axes are also to be understood and interpreted
as orienting intellectual activity toward the realization of an ethical and — given the fact that the intellectual deals primarily in
language — a rhetorical goal. That is, the goal of testifying truthfully and without compromise in concretely analyzed and contextualized situations. Let me immediately and schematically,
then, put forward these six axes one after the other, although
together they make up a cycle. Each of them generates a particular function in the intellectual; all of them intensify self-consciousness and self-reflection; all of them fortify and depend
upon each other.
(1) In an age of proliferating informational resources and control, the management and manipulation of these resources usually results in the misrepresentation, distortion, or effacement of
the human (or inhuman) agency and interests at work. There
exists, therefore, a need for providing counterinformation —
information, that is, that runs counter to and is often hidden by
the prevailing consensus, information whose description and
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analysis is based on the privilege of human agency and responsible choice. Thus, the intellectual fulfills an archival function,
and to do so must, in Foucault’s fine phrase, exercise “a relentless erudition.”34
(2) Styles of writing tied to particular classes, groups, and corporate guilds inevitably also produce special languages, jargons,
or specialized idioms. These specialized languages with their
routinized distancing or alienating codes cannot be dismissed;
they can, however, be learned and, subsequently, translated into
a language that is closer to common sense. Requiring analysis
and the mastering of detail, for the intellectual this is the interpretive or, more accurately, the re-interpretive function.
(3) On the level of both detail and generality, the tendency of
the age is to grasp issues in functional, pragmatic, or realistic
terms. Not only does this obscure the role of interest, perspective, and agency, but it also reduces the likelihood that consequences and ends, human or inhuman, as well as ideals, values,
and principles, will be graspable. Certainly, for example, discussions of war and peace, human rights, and national conflict have
generally been carried on in such a way as if all that mattered
were ethnocentrically defined “U.S. interests,” or, on a less
exalted level, as if the most important thing was not to be “controversial.” Therefore, the intellectual’s role is to demystify by
articulating the basic issues of justice and human good or evil
surrounding these issues, which, where potential or actual violence is concerned, never emerge, but knowledge of which is
essential for understanding. This is an epistemological function.
(4) Specialization of language derives from specialization of
skills, knowledge, and conceptions of activity. These in turn
breed an ethic for one’s own field of eminent domain, for others
an ethic of noninterference. In areas like medicine and politics,
the results have often been unfortunate; in the humanities, the
results have been no less unfortunate, if also less visible so far as
society is concerned. The intellectual’s function here is dramatic:
to interfere and intervene across lines of specialization.
(5) The operations of consensus give rise either to outright
domination or, the other side of the same coin, trivialization. As
Adorno says,

31

04/18/96 3:53 PM

1880sai2.qxd

Macalester International

Vol. 3

The feigning of a true politics here and now, the freezing of historical relations which nowhere seem ready to melt, oblige the
mind to go where it need not degrade itself. Today every phenomenon of culture, even if a model of integrity, is liable to be
suffocated in the cultivation of kitsch. Yet paradoxically in the
same epoch it is to works of art that has fallen the burden of
wordlessly asserting what is barred to politics.35

At such a juncture, in the formulation of alternative intentions
and nontrivial modes of practice, including the aesthetic, the
intellectual’s function is an insurgent one, to provide resistance.
(6) Finally, since Plato and Socrates, the problem of responsibility and what has come to be called practical problem solving
has beset the intellectual. Loyalty, the common good, justice,
and truth attract the policymaker, party member, or loyalist;
repel the true artist or scholar; and extract a uniquely intellectual
fudging trait, also called trimming, from the intelligentsia.
Benda’s contribution to this problem is, I believe, difficult to circumvent. The intellectual’s task, he says, is not to agree, consolidate, or help along, but, rather, eccentrically and crucially to
press distant claims, argue for principle where the prevailing climate counsels expediency, to show the irreconcilability or discrepancy underlying most human encounters. If we find Benda
difficult to accept when he asserts that intellectuals deal in
absolutes, we can modify his argument instead that intellectual
effort bears testimony to discrepancy as an absolute form of
human intercourse. Expressions of solidarity or conscience
under difficult circumstances are, of course, forms of discrepancy. Thus, irreconcilable, irreducible oppositions — between
ideas, peoples, societies, histories, and claims — come to grating
performance in the intellectual’s work. This is the intellectual’s
moral function.
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